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INTRODUCTION

States universally claim access to authority and control over events
and persons. States exercise power within their territories primarily to
maintain and promote public order, protect their assets and wealth, and
ensure the public safety. The end result of these actions is law. The
operational element of law involves combinations invoking cooperation,
reciprocity in treatment and behavior, and dispute management and
settlement.
The primary challenge that all states face, regardless of the values
they prize demands at least a minimal showing of reasonableness in the
enforcement of law. But reasonableness is a difficult, complex standard
and in some respects a future-oriented goal. Wide-spread abuse, often
institutional and government supported, is of course familiar. Our overall
approach to regulation, under these conditions, presupposes that human
beings will act pursuant to the fundamental notions of collective selfinterest and with the aim to achieve common objectives. However,
experiments in recent decades with socialism that professed comparable
notions and failed indicate little hope for anticipating a collective selfinterest in the environment as such.,
*
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1. On the underlying pressures that would seemingly impose themselves upon us and lead
to if not compel the adoption of collective interests, compare HAROLD SPROUT & MARGARET
SPROUT, TOWARD A POLITICS OF THE PLANET EARTH 14 (1971). "The ecological way of seeing
and comprehending envisages international politics as a system of relationships among
interdependent earth-related communities that share with one another an increasingly crowded
planet that offers finite and exhaustible quantities of basic essentials of human well-being and
existence." d.
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The most pressing issues raised in the regulatory process are,
foremost, the strategic issues because they involve the legal order and its
constitution, its allocation of authority and powers, and the authority the
state commands. These concerns take the forefront of all other concerns
with state relations and activities of other states whenever they arise in the
common arena of global interaction and interdependence. These are not
simply isolated claims of sovereignty, but are claims upon each other to
exercise exclusive authority and control over their decisions of
government; claims associated with respect to jurisdiction and law making.
Thus, the same test should be employed whether the events to be
controlled are the environment, the interaction of individuals, regulation,
or the application of standards of reasonableness with regard to that law.
As stated by McDougal and Schle, "And for all types of controversies the
one test that is invariably applied by decision makers is that simple and
ubiquitous, but indispensable, standard of what, considering all relevant
policies and all variables in context, is reasonable as between the parties. "2
In global processes, in particular, we are concerned with this fundamental
constitutive element in state relations. This is the element of a global
community because states that deny such a community, even in the loosest
form, are adopting law almost exclusively to achieve their own objectives.
This adoption would include hegemony over other states and the
assimilation of all objectives under power, especially coercion.
The
problem under scrutiny, i.e., law enforcement, is narrowed down to more
effective patterns when the law to be enforced is domestic law. It is,
therefore, to our advantage to assimilate domestic law into the international
or global law processes and make it an instrument in enforcing law at that
level wherever possible.
These notions offer us, at best, tenuous conceptual frameworks
and mechanisms in return for following the social order processes or the
legal processes that support them. Nevertheless, the enforcement of law
among states, as well as within states, has been claimed by individual
states. We have become aware that it is through the law applying and law
enforcing powers of states, often operating to regulate activities on the
territories of those states or upon the citizens and others under their
jurisdiction and control, that we are to be assured of effective control over
activities on a global scale. It is too early to expect states to enter into
treaties or establish institutions that will take over these tasks and, of
course, deprive them of their sovereignty.
There is no central organization to which states can turn; no world
government in which the enforcement powers are vested. The global
2.

MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 778 (1960).
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community is assimilating many international environmental law
prescriptions and engaging in countless conferences and meetings to make
The effectiveness of international
those prescriptions effective.
environmental law requires the exercise of authority, and even force, to
ensure controls commensurate with the prescriptions adopted.
Additionally, the force invoked for the purposes of enforcement of social
order prescriptions is largely found operative through the instruments of
municipal public orders.
Carried to the extreme, the breakdown in nation states will
aggravate all of the problems of legal regulation that the global community
faces because law and its forcible enforcement go hand in hand. Part of
the problem rests in the day to day decisions that must be built upon and
decisions that support community policy which underlies the global legal
order. Part of this problem lies in the difficulties of promoting collective
Another part rests in the need to
action in the common interest.'
strengthen the constitutive order, a constitution making effort, essential to
impose the authority and control to make the global legal order effective,
and ensure the enforcement of the standards adopted by the global
community. In addition to these problems are those that are emerging
from the rapidly growing body of scientific and technological knowledge at
our disposal. Because so much of this knowledge relates to scientific
resources, and because such knowledge affords us a greater and even
synergistic reach into these resources, the problem is aggravated by the
risks of hostile use of newly uncovered and formidable sources of
destruction. These sources of destruction threaten to get out of control,
spilling and dispersing destruction on a random basis as part of our supply
of lethal weapons.
3.
Mancur Olson, to this effect, is cited by Jan Schneider:
It is not in fact true that the idea that groups will act in their self-interest logically from
the premise of rational and self-interested behavior. It does not follow, because the
individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they
would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested.
Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
ration, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests. In other words, even if all the individuals in a large group are rational and
self-interested, and would gain if, they acted as a group to achieve their common
interest, or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or
group interest.
JAN SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 11-12 (1979).

TOWARDS

AN

Cf. RONALD BAILEY, THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (1995). The various authors
4.
in this book argue that wealth, technology, and the human being may have an impact on the
environment, but they are not all bad for the environment, that there is a stabilizing force leading
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Against these perspectives, and the dynamic change in the public
order among states, we are compelled to re-examine, almost continuously,
the change in the legal order and legal competencies at our disposal to
maintain order and the security of order. The demands for security and
the demands for increased environmental protection through the
enforcement instruments and capabilities of the municipal public orders,
leads us to the linkage between the environment and the security of public
order.
The peoples of the world have become increasingly aware that
Chopal, Chernobyl,
security and environment are closely linked.
COSMOS 954, and other incidents suggest that even indirect links are
beginning to show an impact upon policy. The perspectives of linkage and
of security, both increasing in strength, are revealed in the trend which
shows that there is a gradual movement towards an unwillingness to
tolerate dangerous or harmful conditions in the environment, particularly if
Because environmental
these conditions arise from human activities.
problems and impacts cross transnational boundaries, the tolerances of the
citizens or residents of a given state demand regulations of transnational
and extraterritorial environmental impacts. Both domestic and global
states and their citizens are concerned with harm, interference, and the
reach of the environment which extends over their territories.
The decision and policy making processes of governments indicate
that decisions which employ the democratic process are most likely to be
found in relatively small regional groupings of political units. President
Thomas Jefferson was popular in his day for his writings in presupposing
the rural community and the rural towns as the key elements in the
colonial social order of a democratic state.
Notwithstanding the continuing controversies and the various
choices relating to the most desirable means of social control, the control
and regulation over the environment at the present time is most likely to be
successful if we first support and strengthen the municipal regimes for
regulating the means to protect the environment. This support calls for
clarified prescription of the regulatory scheme and for prompt, timely, and
effective enforcement of its regulations.
We can draw upon these municipal regimes as partners in a larger,
global effort and draw upon their extensive experience in the business of
regulation. States, even in a loosely formed cooperative enterprise, are
likely to be secure in their policies and actions to support or adopt
decisions on a municipal level that they can be certain will be implemented
to ameliorated equilibria, and that resources can be replaced, even if we do not always replace
them in kind. Id.
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on a global scale. But even in these efforts at feeling their way in to
scientifically sound attempts at regulation, due regard must be exercised as
to the decision process itself. We are forced to ask these questions: how
far should the decisions be vested in the marketplace, how far should
regulation go in minimizing or penalizing the abuse from such decisions
affecting the environment, and how far should regulation go in taking over
the decisions itself?
The problems that must be reached through a regulatory regime
may spill over beyond the environmental damage caused by human beings
to the damage caused by nature. We have yet to clarify how far we can
regulate against the damage that may arise from armed conflict even if the
weapons and attacks are limited to the conventional attacks. In seeking to
appraise these conditions our decisions are corrupted further by tendencies
of decision and policy makers, who often lack the scientific skills and
knowledge about the problems that concern them. This leads all who are
concerned to look to a pseudo-science to reveal that damage to the ozone
layer, damage to the high seas, and to the environment.
The
environmental damage can be traced and predicted and thus produce the
data necessary for scientific and technological features in the regulatory
process. The data, like the claims of the states within the global
community, reflect competition for resources, the integrity of the state and
its influence and power, and finally, the security of a sound economy. As
the Director of Environment at the World Bank recently stated in his
foreword to the book by Trolldalen declares:
The book [by Trolldalen on International Environmental
Conflict Resolution] also focuses on the fact the nations
have developed different ways for managing competition
for natural resource utilization as well as for responding to
the effects of environmental degradation.
Evidence
suggests, however, that many such ways are being strained
by accelerating competition for increasingly scarce
resources and the resulting conflicts that are emerging.
Existing resource management policies at many local,
national and international levels simply do not meet the
demands of rapidly growing populations and sustainable
development needs.,

5.
Mohamed T. EI-Ashry, Foreword to JON MARTIN TROLLDALEN, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1992).
Stockholm Declaration on the Human

Environment: Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16,
1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 Corr. 1 (1972), reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420.:

6
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Some of this dispute shifts to the differences between developed
and undeveloped states. The developed states argue in order to maintain
their progress in benefiting from global resources some damage to the
environment is inevitable; however, most damage is not severely harmful,
when balanced against the benefits and when measured over a long period
of time. The undeveloped states insist that they must have the right to
adopt enterprises that may damage the environment, even severely, in
order to catch up with the technological and economic progress of the
developed states.6 But states can proceed jointly with the regulation of
human activities involving the commons throughout the world, including
7
all of outer space. The commentaries on this subject are legion.
It is possible that the common objectives of a joint decision
process, or a process in which many participate, may be that simply of
stability, and order that this, and no more, is the objective. It would
frustrate our efforts here to reach an adequate regulatory regime among
states to suggest that states collectively must reach the identical or same
result common objectives may be sufficient. Compare Justice Jackson in
Lauritzen v. Larsen:8
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their

own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Id. The same formula has been used with regard to radioactive particles arising from the testing
of nuclear weapons in the limited test ban treaty.

6.

See

JON

MARTIN

TROLLDALEN,

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

CONFLICT

RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, UNITAR (1992). The author reviews the
various means for reducing conflict, emphasizing in particular those that involve cooperative
communities among the participants rather than defer to the adversarial, and often hostile,
tribunals for adjudication or arbitration, or the tireless efforts of mediators or conciliators when
they lack authority to prescribe or implement their advice. Id.
7.
Among the books that are helpful in appraising the gradual growth of municipal law as
an instrument for shaping and promoting the global public order, including its legal order, are the
following sources in the data-banks available for these studies. See, e.g., JAN SCHNEIDER,
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL
LAW AND ORGANIZATION (1979); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1987); ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION: PROTECTING
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES (1982); ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS (Edith Brown Weiss
ed., 1992); PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1992); INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: THE MANAGEMENT
AND RESOLUTION OF TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (John Carroll ed., 1988);
LYNTON CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1990); APPROACHES TO
PEACE, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (W. Scott Thompson et al. eds., 1991).
8.

345 U.S. 571 (1953); see MYERS S. MCDOUGAL, The Impact of International Law

Upon National Law: A Policy-OrientedPerspective, 4 S.D. L. Rev. 25, 207-15 (1959).
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International or maritime law in such matters as
this [(i.e., involving the refusal of the U.S. Supreme Court
to permit the application of United States statutory
protection under the Jones Act to a Danish seaman injured
upon a Danish ship in Havana Harbor)] does not seek
uniformity and does not purport to restrict any nation from
making and altering its laws to govern its own shipping
and territory. However, it aims at stability and order
through usages which considerations of comity, reciprocity
and long-range interest have developed to define the
domain which each nation will claim as its own. Maritime
law, like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or
resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining
and valuing points of contact between the transactions and
the states of governments whose competing laws are
involved. The criteria, in general, appear to be arrived at
from weighing of the significance of one or more
connecting factors between the shipping transaction
regulated and the national interest served by the assertion
of authority. It would not be candid to claim that our
courts have arrived at satisfactory standards or apply those
that they profess with perfect consistency. But in dealing
with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of
the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to
be avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which
we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a
foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for
a foreign country to apply its law to an American
transaction. 9

9.

Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 582.

In the same case, Justice Jackson expounds upon the

remarks cited in the text of this article with further clarification, indicating a development not
unlike that which we might expect in international environmental law:
Respondent places great stress upon the assertion that petitioner's commerce and

contacts with the ports of the United States are frequent and regular, as the basis for
applying our statutes to incidents aboard his ships.

But the virtue and utility of sea-

borne commerce lies in its frequent and important contacts with more than one
country. If, to serve some immediate interest, the courts of each were to exploit every
such contact to the limit of its power, it is not difficult to see that a multiplicity of
conflicting and overlapping burdens would blight international carriage by sea. Hence,

courts of this and other commercial nations have generally deferred to a non-national
or international maritime law of impressive maturity and universality. It has the force
of law, not from extraterritorial reach of national laws, nor from abdication of its
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The problem raised by controlling the environment necessarily
draws our attention to the decision and policy making processes within the
states and among them. Myres McDougal and his associates have shown
the path is toward shaping, even though incrementally and gradually, the
public order of states. Their writings seem to favor positive efforts at
improving cooperation. This enterprise in many ways constitutes a major
process of learning adopted by governments. Key to these perspectives is
the recognition that we do not yet have a world community, adequate in
terms of decision making competence, to regulate human activities
affecting the environment.o Hence, with regard to law and control:
Clearly, systems of public order differ not only in
territorial comprehensiveness but also in the completeness
of arrangements in terms of the different value processes
regulated, and in the internal balance of competence for
decision inclusive of the entire area in question and that for

decision relating exclusively to component areas within it.
To the extent that there is universal international law some
prescriptions are inclusive of the globe; other prescriptions
recognized self-direction by smaller units.
Regional
international law has a corresponding separation between
region-wide
prescriptions
and sub-regional
units.
sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance by common consent of civilized
communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable commercial relations.
Id. at 581-82.
10. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 2, at 14, 15, 16, 961. A German publicist, Dr. Theo
Sommer, took issue with the visionary projection of a world governed under global order and
under its controls imposed for security and safety. He expressed his views in the vocabulary of a
politician:
Even world federalists like Robert Hutchins were forced to admit: "One world in the
grip of a tyrant would be worse than many worlds. In a situation where there are
many worlds, there is at least a chance of escaping from one into the other." In the
countries of the East, however, there was never the slightest inclination to entrust
security to an international organization in which the tune was called by the monopolycapitalist states. It never crossed Stalin's mind to sacrifice his lofty ambitions to the
idea of One World - unless that world was to be a communist one. .

.

. However

beneficial the peacekeeping missions were in individual cases, during the period of
East-West conflict they could not obscure the fact that the world organization had
failed in its primary task of ridding the world of the scourge of war ....
For the time
being, the world remains divided in two: there is a zone of peace, democracy, human
rights, civil order, and prosperity; and there is a zone of discord, of authoritarian
regimes, where human rights are denied, where turbulence reigns, in some cases
anarchy. "One world for all" is the long-term aim. Yet it remains to be seen whether
a single world state can ever arise from the present world of many states.
Dr. Theo Summer, .Fifty Years of the United Nations: The Futile Dream of Peace,
DEUTSCHLAND, 1995, at 12-14.

Almond
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Similarly, nation states like the United States distinguish
between the inclusiveness of federal authority and the
proper domain of the internal states. "
With these perceptual realities before us, our approach is most
likely to be enlightened and moved toward the desired cooperative regime
if we start by doing what we can with the smaller political units, i.e., with
the states throughout the world. Our objectives will be to provide a
general approach to the overall objectives, policy and law, and law in
terms of principles wherever recourse to the more precisely formulated
rules is not possible or not desirable. The overarching objective is that of
human dignity:
Our overriding aim is to clarify and aid in the
implementation of a universal order of human dignity....
The essential meaning of human dignity as we understand
it can be succinctly stated: it refers to a social process in
which values are widely and not narrowly shared, and in
which private choice, rather than coercion is emphasized
as the predominant modality of power.' 2
The problem is global in nature because harm to the environment
necessarily involves, harmful impacts that cross transnational borders and
entails the great uninhabited areas of the globe referred to as the "global
commons."' 3 These commons are found on the high seas, in outer space,
in the polar regions, and by some in the great deserts. 4 The environmental
problems in the areas just discussed are problems that are shared, or are
felt, by numerous states."
The regulation of human activities that involve harmful impacts
upon the environment raises major questions concerning the political will
to take the steps and provide the funds to minimize environmental damage
that is most likely to result in harm to human beings and the ecologies they
seek to preserve. Resolution through regulation calls for shaping the
decision and policy processes to channel human activities, to define those
that are harmful, to provide guideposts and criteria relating to permissible
or appropriate conduct where the environment is involved, and so on.

11. Id.
12.

Id.

13.

LYNTON CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 257 (2d ed. 1990).

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

10
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Although we have had substantial experience in the regulatory
process involving countless human activities, the process for protecting the
environment can be reduced to fundamental and workable principles for
the environment once singled out. The extensive amount of law and
regulatory efforts connected with regulation, whether it takes place
domestically within states or among them, does not need the repetition of
the countless articles on this subject. A key element of this effort is to
clarify who the participants are in affecting and regulating the activities
involving the environment, what their perspectives and objectives might
be, and what options might be available to reach an optimum process both
for conserving and protecting the environment. Human activities cannot
escape their link to environmental surroundings.
The outcome of such a process inevitably involves the inherent
element found in state interaction, to wit, the continuing dynamic flow of
claims and counterclaims of states or their citizens. This process may
ultimately converge toward the shared global or international law, aimed
specifically at protecting the environment, which will be marked by
variations in the approaches taken. Hence, caution should be exercised
with regard to our expectations of the evolution of international law from
municipal legislative and regulatory practice.
The principles may also be identified as criteria affording
standards for judging action to be taken, or for judging action that has
been taken and is in issue between the claimants in a law suit or other fora
involving the settlement of disputes. This process of claims extends our
appraisals beyond those that look to the undertakings themselves. The
effectiveness of law is our key to the usefulness of law and its value as an
instrument of the social order. The effectiveness of law, or of the
decisions that amount to law, is seen in part in the effectiveness of the
enforcement of law. However, we can go a little further. It is also seen in
the effectiveness of the law on state conduct, even where enforcement or
coercion are not involved to ensure that effectiveness.
II. CRITERIA
To establish the terms of reference of regulation, criteria are
examined in this article, which are formulated as standards or guidelines
for regulating activities that may affect the environment, or for
distinguishing activities that materially impair the environment from the
activities whose impact is de minimis. The criteria proposed below are
provided on a tentative basis to provide an opportunity for criticism and
constructive development of a regulatory scheme. They are open to
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debate, clarification, or comment to arguments that would modify, refine,
or reject them.
The criteria proposed here are synonymous with guidelines. The
terms are ambiguous and interchangeable. However, our long experience
with principles, maxims of action, standards, and so on, suggest that we
would need all the paraphernalia of the decision making apparatus to make
modern decisions workable in the larger context of interaction among
states and their institutions. Without that apparatus, criteria treated as
principles are likely to lack the necessary operational and applicational
precision of decision makers of states to make them effective or
enforceable. As guidelines, the criteria offer us an opportunity to gain
recognition and a gradual coherent acceptance of objectives that with
continuing convergence can lead to customary activities, custom, and
customary international law itself.
Familiar uses of criteria includes the "just war doctrine,""

modernized" by former Secretary of Defense Weinberger to provide moral
content to the decisions to commit United States military forces abroad.
Then with further refinements, in doctrinal form, by former Secretary of
State Shultz, to preempt, if necessary, major threats to the United States
and its "interests." 8 Similarly, we can turn to analogies made by Sun Tzu
in his "art of war," which articulates principles in the form of "estimates,"
"strategies," and the like.' 9 Additionally, the United States-Soviet Accords
16. ALAN N. SABROSKY & ROBERT L. SLOANE,
APPRAISAL OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE (1988).

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

THE RECOURSE TO WAR:

AN

19. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR (S.B. Griffith trans., 1963). This text includes the
general principles and the "gloss" or commentary added by other military commanders of ancient
China. Sun Tzu also provides us with a large number of principles and standards dealing with
the specific activities involving warfare. As with Weinberger, he infuses the moral dimension,
the major dimension of morale and sustaining power and will of the people, into the principles.
The "just war" thinking and doctrine that was adopted by Weinberger and Sun Tzu are attempts
to attain control over situations threatening public order by resort to force "as a last resort." Id.
This argument presupposes that the military commander is able to make such judgments,
especially during the heat of battle. Eckhardt, in the Sabrosky-Sloane text takes this point of
view by illustrating the application of principles within the context of military force. As a result
the author provides us with how, analogously, we would invoke principles to protect the
environment:
[W]hen a country breaches international law by aggression which violates the sovereign
rights of another state, the injured state is justified, as a last resort, in using force for
self protection. In seeking permission "to kill people and to break things," it will use
the internationally recognized standard of "self defense."
It will attempt to act
collectively within the United Nations or within a regional framework, although on
rare occasions it may act unilaterally. The aims of the aggrieved state will be stated
domestically with specificity. Execution of this "political warrant to wage war" will

12
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of 1 9 6 120and 196221 to control nuclear weapons show the use of general
principles, modified in subsequent drafts to provide more specific controls.
The Accords provide valuable examples of the approach that is taken here
with regard to the environment, in which general guidelines, criteria, and
principles are reduced to very specific provisions with regard to military
forces and weapons.2

III. DRAFT GUIDELINES
A.
States shall enact and enforce legislation to protect their own
environment, regulate activities, and prevent harm or impacts from their
be by professionals who are guided by internationally recognized rules. The goal of
using violence is preservation of the state and a return to a peaceful international order.
SABROSKY & SLOAN, supra note 16, at 4.
20. For a useful assessment with the Accords in the appendix, see Andrew Martin, Legal
Aspects of Disarmament,BRIT. INST. INT'L. & COMP. L. (Supp. 7) (1963). Various innovations
were attempted in the accords, including the use of stages to achieve the overall objectives, the
adoption of general or abstract principles, and the development of the precise rules or standards
to be adopted under the guidance of the general principles. It should be noted, however, that the
U.S.-Soviet Accords tend to unite as one the principles and the objectives sought by the
application of those principles. From the Joint Statement of the 1961 Accords, the objectives are
expressed as follows:
The United States and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to recommend the following principles
as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other
states to cooperate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament
in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.
1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will ensure
that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for
settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the
establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and
effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles
of the United Nations Charter.
The principles include:
5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no
stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain
military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.
6. [Alil disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under
such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all
parties are honoring their obligations.
7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen
institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by
peaceful means. [An International peace force is then proposed to be armed
commensurate with the hostilities that might be faced].
Id. This Joint Statement provides a basis for the proposal on environment and indicates how such
proposals and criteria were attempted through a disarmament, without success, in the past.
Therefore, much depends upon the global community and its support. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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activities upon the environment affecting other states. Such legislation
shall extend to the environment of the territories under their jurisdiction or
control, and to all activities that might impair or harm those environments
or the environments of other states, or the common environments of outer
space, the high seas, the polar regions, and the global deserts.
COMMENT: This standard can, by way of consent among
states, be projected to regulate activities that are extraterritorial in nature.
The major premise is that environmental problems tend to be peripatetic.
States do not and cannot confine the problems or the harm they create to
that associated directly with their own territories, or that directly overhead.
Experience with implementing standards under municipal systems as
directed by the International Labor Organizations suggests that the laws of
nation states and their regulatory practice may differ. However, the
primary expectation of harmonizing laws is to reach common objectives of
cooperation, prevention of harm, protection, and conservation.
With this in mind, it is possible to build on this and subsequent
criteria to provide the guidelines to those who would look to a
comprehensive control over all human activities that might harm the
environment. This control includes the environment of individual states as
well as the environment of others, including that of the global commons.
The guidelines are expressed in concepts that include territorial and
extraterritorial authority. The United States, for example, has adopted
environmentally protective legislation relating to the acts of the Federal
agencies abroad, including not only those occurring on-the territories, but
also those in locales such as the military bases located in other states.
But while this criteria does not define legal harm to the
environment. General principles of harm, accountability, responsibility,
and liability are part of our jurisprudence. They can be tapped in the
However, a case by case analysis can be
customary procedures.
problematic in the development of a regulatory scheme. Nonetheless, the
term harm can be defined by the relevant participants involved with
environmental impacts from the general practice and principles adopted
The criteria can include a
among states in the global community.
definition of harm, or at least the harm that is expected to fall under the
control of the regulatory regime.
Furthermore, the criteria does not define the term environment.
An appropriate definition either for strengthened guidelines or for precise
rules of regulation can be taken from existing municipal legislation.
Conversely it can be formulated by choosing the relevant elements of the
Also, a general definition
municipal legislation of differing states.
covering environment in a comprehensive way can be adopted,
accompanied in the legislative provision by specific environmental
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features. In the United States there are separate, but associated, provisions
of protection for clean water, clean air, radioactive, and other dangerous
23
materials.
The proposal is tenuous in one major sense: states in their real
world interactions may refuse to enact legislation even to cover their own
territories, let alone activities in foreign territories. States have the
additional and essential problem of enforcement. Where activities are
within their jurisdiction or control they can legislate and enforce that
legislation. The problem grows more complex if their assertion of control
overlaps with that of other states. This may be resolved by treaty or
international agreement, as in the drug trade, or by an international
organization, as in the powers delegated to the World Trade Organization
made part of the recent General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Possibilities for intensifying the regulatory process might include the
adoption of an international process for filing reports in the nature of
environmental protection and control impact statements. This adoption
would follow the practice of states using such impact statements in a
variety of contexts.
B.
States or their citizens that engage in activities that harm or are
likely to harm the environment of other states or cause harm to the citizens
of other states by causing damage to the environment shall be responsible
for restoring those harmed to the status quo ante by compensation, or other
forms of acceptable relief if it is not possible to restore them to the status
quo ante, and also for taking such corrective steps as are required under
community policies and standards.
Harm to the environment includes harm to the environment
affecting other states or their citizens as well as harm to the common
environment that is shared among states or not within the jurisdiction or
control of any of them.
COMMENT: This criterion may be made effective by adopting the
general principles of state responsibility drafted by the International Law
Commission.?' Enforcement to ensure the assumption of responsibility,
and of accountability and liability among states for the harm they have
caused is perhaps too difficult a problem to be resolved at this time. It
would require states to adhere to the decisions or judgment of independent
tribunals or panels of experts or to fact-finding entities that would establish
23.

See42 U.S.C. §11001 (Supp. 1993).

24.

See generally IAN BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONSIBILrrY (1983).

the International Law Commission are included in the Annex.
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their responsibility, and then establish the restoration, compensation, and
the like to be imposed.
Accordingly, this criterion can be given
clarification by a form of gloss. It can include in its comments, or as a
separate annex to the entire set of provisions, the principles of state
responsibility as adopted in the International Law Commission, or a set of
principles specifically designed for the purposes of the environmental
standards.
C.
In order to establish comprehensive and flexible controls against
harm to the environment, states shall establish an Environmental Control
Agency, vested with sufficient powers, authority, and control to ensure
protection to the environment and to undertake prevention of activities that
are likely to cause harm. The Agency shall adopt and provide for policies,
programs, and their implementation to reduce or eliminate harm that might
affect the environment.
COMMENT:
The adoption and creation of an international
organization such as the Agency proposed here will require an exercise of
the will of states to jointly manage and control activities relating to the
environment. This criterion is, therefore, recommendatory in nature or
prospective in the sense that the timing for such an organization and its
controls may need to await the development of trust and confidence among
states to act jointly. They will also need to have at their disposal the
competencies among personnel in the organization that will make the
institution acceptable to states at large.
The assumption is that a
comprehensive and fully satisfactory system of regulation and control is
not likely to be attained unless there is an institutional arrangement to
provide the monitoring, fact-finding, investigatory, data exchange,
reporting, and perhaps even the dispute settlement functions.
The adoption of institutions to regulate activities affecting the
environment will be slow because states are reluctant to adhere to
decisions imposed by others, including international organizations of which
they are a member. There is reluctance even where other states are
subject to the same decisions, as the demands on France to cease nuclear
weapons testing have recently shown. Even though there were great
pressures following the second World War to presuppose strong powers in
the Security Council of the United Nations, the United Nations Charter
would not have been adopted unless the major states retained the right to
veto resolutions or decisions of the Council that were contrary to their own
policies. We are compelled to make progress in such matters by moving
in gradual steps, i.e., as the global community itself gives signs of a more
pervasive spirit of cooperation.
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Experience of various agencies suggest that the delegation of the
sovereignty of specific functions such as those relating to the environment
can occur on a step-wise basis. For example, the International Atomic
Energy Agency discovered in the course of developing nuclear power and
energy that it was regulating against the development of design grade
nuclear materials.2 Also, the anticipated future experience of agencies
such as the World Trade Organization is now part of the General
26
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Experience also reveals that while states may be reluctant to put
into words their plans for future endeavors, they are likely to be persuaded
to act consistently with community standards when these standards appear
in the decisions or arguments of tribunals, such as the international courts,
and others who are under implicit responsibilities or obligations.
However, states will be aware that if the international organization can
function, notwithstanding their rejection of a program or decision, the
organization may impose upon their claims of exclusive control under their
demands for sovereignty. Hence, environmental controls at this level may
be a matter of compromises combined with the effectiveness of
undertakings among states.
D.
States in fulfilling their responsibilities under these criteria shall
adopt the following principles:
(a) the overriding principle of state cooperation applicable to exchange
of assistance, technical information, and know-how, and support of
all kinds to ensure through joint efforts the minimization of
environmental harm;
(b) the principle of disclosure, with the responsibility of reporting on a
timely basis the presence of dangerous materials and dangerous
activities that are likely to cause harm or lead to the impairment of
the environment, or cause harm to others lawfully using the global
commons, including the high seas and outer space;
(c) the principle of reciprocal assistance and of reciprocally supportive
interaction with others pursuant to the duty to enforce municipal
environmental laws and apprehend those who have violated such
laws;

25.

ALLEN L. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION:

PROTECTING THE

(1992).
26. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Dec. 15, 1993, KAV 3778, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125 1130 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1995).
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(d) the principle of supportive judicial assistance [relating to the
enforcement of law, the judicial proceedings relating to the
enforcement of law; the transfer of evidence; testimony of
witnesses; and so on] to provide for assistance in connection with
judicial proceedings or adjudications concerned with the
enforcement of each other's environmental laws or in connection
with other dispute settlement activities adopted by the disputants to
resolve disagreements, disputes, or issues involving the
environment;
(e) the principle of extradition and return, i.e., extradition or the
willingness to impose under their own legislation the appropriate
prosecution and penalty against wrongdoers involved in willful
damage to the environment.
COMMENT: These principles will require further elaboration in a
separate article which would elaborate the general principle of cooperation
For
Some assumptions have been made.
among the participants.
example, that states will be willing to provide each other with assistance
and cooperation as required in this principle, that the criminal provisions
for violating environmental laws will be enacted and enforced again with
the assistance of others, that the participants will abide by principles
relating to the prompt reporting and exchange of data concerning harmful
substances or activities, including those caused by nature as well as by
people in space, and that full assistance will be provided for those involved
in judicial proceedings or proceedings before other tribunals or in other
fora.
E.
Disputes, disagreements, and the like shall be resolved in peaceful
ways including, but not limited to, adjudication and the alternatives for
adjudication with a view to the restoration of trust and confidence among
the parties with regard to the claims they have made regarding the
environment, harm to the environment, or promoting the environmental
conditions.
COMMENT: This constitutes a further extension of the principle
of cooperation, and recommends the adoption of alternative dispute
settlement measures.
These, including mediation, conciliation, fact
finding, monitoring, good offices, and the use of friendly interventions.
This differs from adjudication and arbitration because they are not
adversarial or confrontational in nature and because they rest upon the
principle of cooperation. A provision similar to this has been adopted in
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter promoting cooperation in general
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among states with regard to the objectives of the United Nations.", States
whose activities involve the environment, and who are engaged in joint
ventures or enterprise with other states, or who have incurred
responsibility and liability for harmful acts affecting the environment
undertake to restore the trust and confidence amongst themselves. The
common objective is to promote the environment through cooperative
attitudes. To promote this principle states should be encouraged to enter
into agreements for alternative dispute resolution which will encourage
them to continue their joint enterprise without delay and remain unaffected
by the delays of resolving disputes.
F.
Activities and materials including natural phenomena causing,
likely to cause, or about to cause harm to the environment shall be
reported on a timely basis to other states and to the public at large.
COMMENT: This principle supports and adds strength to the
principle of disclosure stated earlier. Reporting can be established through
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or through a separate
authority. It is evident that this provision calls for a continuous monitoring
action. Those involved in activities affecting the environment adversely
will report on whether their materials are harmful or are materials that
may, upon initial use, appear to be harmful, but that prove not to be
harmful during their use. Such reports are to extend to activities, or
failure to act, that have led to harm to the environment.
G.
Undertakings pursued under these criteria and principles shall be
performed in good faith by the participants with a view toward ensuring
that the environment will serve the global community at large, and that
activities involving the environment, including those activities that
subsequently, even if unforeseeably affecting the environment, will be
conducted with the utmost due care and conducted to ensure protection and
conservation of resources.
COMMENT: At an early stage the participants are likely to enter
into treaties and international agreements incorporating principles such as
those indicated in the above list. Those proposed here are not likely to be
adopted in the form in which they are drafted because states are unwilling
to reject their sovereign claims to the actions that are required of them.
This provision puts a duty of foreseeability upon those involved, and

27.
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includes the standard of due care and utmost good faith in meeting
obligations.
H.
If any state or any individual under the jurisdiction or control of a
state has reason to believe that its activities are likely, whether imminent or
not, to cause harm to the environment, it shall immediately notify the
Environmental Control Agency and the appropriate offices of
governments.
COMMENT: Notification of imminent harm, or harm in general,
is important in some aspects of control over activities. Those about to
dispose of nuclear waste might be among those whose activities are likely,
even on an imminent basis, to endanger others through their impacts on the
environment. Those engaged in the use of explosive devices are likely to
find themselves in situations where the environment, even if localized,
may be endangered. Notification should be to those who can provide as
wide a coverage and on as urgent a basis as possible.
I.
Those involved in armed combat shall take precautions of the
utmost due care to ensure that their military activities, weapons, exercises,
and the threats of their weapons shall avoid the imposition of harm to the
environment, and to assume responsibilities as soon as feasible should
harm occur to correct the harm that has been caused, through restoration
to the status quo ante, or by assistance including funding to others who
undertake such restoration.
COMMENT: This provision goes beyond the usual war provision
law that tends to exempt the belligerents from responsibilities to the global
social order. Environmental harm caused in, or during, armed conflict of
any kind is presently regulated to ensure no harm or minimal harm to the
environment.
The Geneva Protocols of 1977 have a provision that
prohibits harm to the environment during armed conflict.2 The states that
are party to the Environmental Modification Techniques Convention
undertake as their responsibility or obligation that environmental
modification techniques shall not be used in a hostile manner to cause
harm to another state that is party to the Convention. Similarly, there are

28. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, June 8, 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 85 (entered

into force Oct. 5, 1978).
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protections in other agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty of 196729
and the Moon Treaty.3 The next step in protections under international
law calls for treaties and agreements that extend, as these proposals do,
into cleaning up the damage caused by the use of weapons or engagement
in war.,'
The provision considered here can be supplemented by
provisions relating to the research, testing, and development of weapons,
either old or new, and by provisions relating to military exercises, and so
on. Such agreements are not likely to win the support of many states, or
in practice, to ensure the protection of the environment from the obvious
impact of warfare.
The typical claim is that of necessity. States act through necessity
to preserve their public order or to defend themselves, and states that have
caused damage by such actions are excused from the harm they have
caused. If these stumbling blocks can be overcome, then international law
will advance to ban warfare that has been leaning toward destruction and
attacks that are indiscriminate, or subject to increased use of weapons of
mass destruction, and toward the growing tolerance as to indiscriminate
29. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205,
6 I.L.M. 386 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967).
30. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Dec. 5, 1979, G.A. Res. 34\68, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N. Doc.
A\RES/34/68 (1979), reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 1434 (1979) (entered into force July 11, 1984).
31. The destruction to the environment and, in particular, the atmosphere caused by the
bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and by the hydrogen bomb testing of the major states is not
fully known. All wars tend to carry destructive force that has some impact on the environment.
During World War II, according to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, a major attack
on Tokyo led to more deaths in a six-hour period than those that occurred in similar period at any
time in the recorded history of warfare:
Gerald Curtis LeMay's subsequent mission report emphasized that the object of the
attack "was not to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations." But the destruction
that first windy night was in fact indiscriminate to the point of atrocity. . . nearly
seventeen square miles of the Japanese capital burned to the ground with at least a
hundred thousand people killed and hundreds of thousands injured.
Richard Rhodes, The General and World War III, NEW YORKER, June 19, 1995, at 47.
Though not providing us the authority for his remarks, the author mentions the total
bombing destruction of sixty three Japanese cities, and a million Japanese civilian deaths.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki survived to become atom bomb targets because they had not been on the
eirlier target lists. General LeMay is cited as recognizing that if the United States had lost the
war, he "would have been tried as a war criminal." This remark of course must be taken in the
proper context: political leaders, military commanders, and countless others would probably
have been tried by Japan and Germany or promptly executed according to their military practice
of the time. And many would have been executed for crimes or subjected to purported war
crimes that might not provide the due process protections we expect with regard to prosecution of
crimes. Several high level leaders of the Western states insisted upon summary execution of the
Nazi war criminals. Id.
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weapons and attacks. Tolerances of this kind liberalize use of force in
peacetime, because they undermine public support by revealing an absence
of support from a public too cynical to believe that war, once started, can
be effectively humanized, or guided by the still emerging criteria of an
international humanitarian law.
To gain public support states can refine their official statements by
narrating their meaning.
Lawyers are frequently taught that in trial
practice one of their main tasks is to prepare and tell a story that is more
convincing than the story told by their adversaries.
As the recent atom bomb debates indicate, the story of hostile
adversaries will be a story that they share with regard to: threat,
deterrence, and preemption in certain attacks, i.e., when the attacking state
decides that its vital interests or survival is involved. Rhodes advises that
a doctrine of preemption had become part of the United States "story"
with regard to war excusing acts that were taken at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.32 These were identified as legitimate during war time because
such strikes did not exceed those achieved with conventional napalm
weapons. 3 Also, because the strikes were taken to destroy an intolerable
war capability of the adversary, reaching for "strategic" purposes, even
into major strikes at the military industrial support couched in the civilian
population.Y4 Furthermore, the doctrine of preemption was adopted where
an adversary's threatening conduct is clearly established by our
intelligence to enable us to infer the beginning of a first strike, entitling an
attack to disarm the adversary to deny that strike. Guidance and control
over the stories adopted and continuously refined among nations may be a
possible means for ensuring relations that make up the content of that story
falling into place and shaping future decisions and policies.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because guidelines both reflect past state practice and are aimed at
future practice, we can expect that other guidelines may be added as the
program of municipal regulation and international regulation continue to
interact. However, there are limits upon what the United States can
achieve with its own resources, or even when it attempts coalitions with
other states. It is a truism that the United States should not commit funds
or assume undertakings unless, in doing so, it foresees that it can modify,
reverse, or block environmental harm or damage, or unless it is compelled

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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to react to crises or emergencies that may affect it severely. Nevertheless,
if it intends to commit funds, it should monitor the relation of the
environmental objectives and the funds committed, including those funded
by the United States and those by others.
Similarly, the United States should not assume a disproportionate
share of the financial obligations, especially in light of the increased stake
of other major economies throughout the world. Finally, the United States
should inform and secure the support of the American people of such
actions, and provide them with a convincing picture that the most
appropriate measures have been taken to prevent harmful impacts as well
restoring the situation as close as possible to that which had existed before
the damage had occurred.
To some extent, these policies reflect the need to fund
environmental protections and to maintain the regulatory apparatus for
controls through fees or licenses charged to those whose activities will
affect the environment. This approach would then strengthen the element
of the user-pays principle.
The costs may be high, but where
unmanageable costs for protecting the environment run hand-in-glove with
the program to be undertaken, it would then be obvious that this would
need to be taken into account before the venture proceeds and the activity
would need to be reviewed as to whether it is a desirable program.

